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Abstract
In 1998, Colombia entered a severe recession. GDP contracted by 4.2% in 1999, and the
unemployment rate surpassed 20%. Political turmoil exacerbated trade and fiscal
imbalances. The economic downturn led to credit contractions, particularly in the
mortgage market. The nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio increased from 8% in December
1997 to 16.1% in November 1999. The NPL ratio for residential mortgages grew from 6%
in December 1997 to 19.8% in January 2000.
In 1999, due to the continuous deterioration of credit institutions, the government, through
FOGAFIN (the Financial Institutions Guarantee Fund—the state agency for bank
resolutions and deposit insurance), initiated rescue policies to restore public confidence
and solvency in the financial system. The government implemented a three-year economic
recovery program that, among other measures, included capitalization of credit
institutions. This authority was given through Resolution 006 of 1999, in which FOGAFIN
granted loans to the shareholders of institutions to be used exclusively to recapitalize their
institutions. Resolution 006 of 2001 gave the authority to further capitalize credit
institutions specialized in mortgage lending.
Keywords: capital injections, Colombia, financial crisis, FOGAFIN, recapitalizations

This case study is part of the Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS) selection of New Bagehot Project
modules considering broad-based asset capital injections programs.
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Colombia: FOGAFIN Capitalizations of
1999 and 2001
At a Glance
In the late 1990s, Colombia’s
economy weakened. Political turmoil
exacerbated
trade
and
fiscal
imbalances. The Asian and Russian
financial crises contributed to the
deterioration in market confidence.
The economic downturn led to credit
contractions, particularly in the
mortgage market. In 1998, Colombia
entered a severe recession (IMF
2001). In 1999, GDP contracted by
4.2%, while the unemployment rate
surpassed 20% (FOGAFIN 2009). The
nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio
increased from 8% in December 1997
to 16.1% in November 1999. The NPL
ratio for residential mortgages grew
from 6% in December 1997 to 19.8%
in January 2000 (IMF 2001).
In
November
1998,
Colombia
declared a “Social and Economic State
of Emergency” through Decree 2330,
followed with the announcement of
the first set of measures in support of
the financial sector through Decree
2331
that
included
support
mechanisms for mortgage debtors
from institutions facing liquidation
(Decree 2330 1998; Decree 2331
1998).

Summary of Key Terms
Purpose: The government capitalization was a line of
credit provided to the shareholders of credit institutions
to exclusively strengthen their capitalization ratios.
Announcement Date

August 10, 2001 (second line)
End of Issuance Window

December 31, 1999, last day to
apply (first line)
July 31, 2002, last day to apply
(second line)

Legal Authority

Resolution 006 of 1999 (first)
Resolution 006 of
2001(second)

Program Size

Unspecified

Total Utilization

COP 1.09 trillion4
COP 492.8 billion in 1999
COP 599.9 billion in 2001

Participants

14 financial institutions: 10 in
1999 and four (specialized in
mortgage lending) in 2001

Administrator

FOGAFIN (Financial
Institutions Guarantee Fund)

Notable Features

Institutions had to write off
NPLs before the capitalization
process. Then, FOGAFIN
granted loans to institutions to
be used exclusively for
capitalization.

In 1999, due to the continuous
deterioration of credit institutions,
the government, through FOGAFIN
(the Financial Institutions Guarantee
Fund—the state agency for bank

4

June 30, 1999 (first line)

The 2001 resolution was
specifically targeted for
institutions specialized in
mortgage lending.

Exchange rate in June 1999 was Colombian pesos (COP) 1,693 = $1 (FRED 2021).
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resolutions and deposit insurance), initiated rescue policies to restore public confidence
and solvency in the financial system. It aimed to avoid systemic risk, control moral hazard,
minimize direct government administration in the financial sector, and reduce fiscal costs
(FOGAFIN 2009). The Colombian government launched a three-year economic recovery
program supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the InterAmerican Development Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) that
included capitalization of credit institutions, resolution and restructuring measures for
unviable banks and other financial institutions, and other various rescue measures related
to debtor law and housing reform (FOGAFIN 2001; IMF 2001; Morrison 2000). In June
1999, to provide capitalization for both public and private credit institutions, the
Colombian government passed Resolution 006 of 1999.
In regard to public banks, to preserve financial stability, strengthen their equity, recover
their viability, reduce fiscal costs of cleaning up, and minimize government participation in
the financial sector, the government decided to privatize all public banks with the
exception of Banco Agrario, which remained the only public bank, given its importance to
provide financing to small and medium-sized farmers in the country (FOGAFIN 2009).
The capitalization process for public banks was composed of five stages: clean-up, capital
strengthening, disposal of NPLs, administrative restructuring, and sale of the institution
(FOGAFIN 2000). For private banks, the capitalization process was composed of three
stages: clean-up, capital strengthening, and signing of a performance agreement (FOGAFIN
2000).
A total of 10 institutions were capitalized through Resolution 006 of 1999 for a total of COP
652,821 million, of which COP 492,788 million were FOGAFIN loans and COP 160,033
million were contributions by shareholders (FOGAGIN 2009; see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Use of Capitalization Line of 1999 (Millions of Colombian Pesos—COP)
FOGAFIN Loans

Shareholders

Total
Capitalization

%
Shareholders/
Total
Capitalization

Institution

Date

ShortTerm

LongTerm

Total

(Cash
and
1Year
Term)

Colpatria

Aug/1999

38,110

174,001

212,111

57,454

269,565

21.3%

Banco
Superior

Jul/1999

8,806

85,047

93,853

25,041

118,894

21.1%

Banco de
Credito

Dec/1999

—

59,965

59,965

14,992

74,957

20%

Interbanco

Oct/1999

1,016

42,181

43,197

15,441

58,638

26.3%

Banco Union

Jul/1999

1,803

25,525

27,328

5,371

32,699

16.4%

Corfinorte

Dec/1999

—

19,752

19,752

27,942

47,694

58.6%

Coltefinancie
ra

Oct/1999

9,104

19,348

28,452

11,254

39,706

28.3%

Multifinanci
era

Nov/1999

—

2,863

2,863

1,939

4,802

40.4%

Credinver

Feb/2000

88

2,050

2,138

599

2,737

21.9%

Confinancier
a

Nov/2000

—

3,129

3,129

—

3,129

0%

58,927

433,861

492,788

160,033

652,821

24.5%

Total

Note: Banco Selfin and Banco Findesarrollo requested access to the line. However, their
shareholders did not capitalize their corresponding portion, and the banks therefore were
liquidated.
Sources: FOGAFIN 2000; FOGAFIN 2009.

Four out of the five private banks specialized in mortgage lending received capitalization
through Resolution 006 of 2001. These were Colpatria, AV Villas, Colmena, and Conavi. The
other bank, Davivienda, did not request access. The total capitalization amounted to
COP 716 billion, of which COP 599.9 billion were FOGAFIN loans granted and COP 116
billion were contributions by shareholders, 16.2% of the total capitalization (FOGAFIN
2009; see Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Use of Capitalization Line of 2001 (Billions of Colombian Pesos—COP)
FOGAFIN Loans

Capitalization

%
Shareholders/Total
Capitalization

35

100

35%

260

—

260

0%

—

120

30

150

20%

113.7

41.2

154.9

51

206

24.8%

429.7

118.2

599.9

116

716

16.2%

Institution

ShortTerm

LongTerm

BOCAS

Total

Shareholder
s

Colpatria

—

40

25

65

AV Villas

52

156

52

Colmena

—

120

Conavi

—

Total

52

Total

*BOCAS were bonds optionally convertible into shares.
Source: FOGAFIN 2009.

Overall, FOGAFIN granted loans through both capitalization lines of 1999 and 2001 for
COP 1.09 trillion to 13 credit institutions. Colpatria was the only institution to access both.
Shareholders contributed COP 276 billion (20.2% of the total capitalization). The total
amount of capitalizations was COP 1.37 trillion (FOGAFIN 2009; see Figures 1–3).
Figure 3: Use of Capitalization Lines of 1999 and 2001 (Millions of Colombian Pesos—
COP)

Resolutions

Number of
Institution FOGAFI
s
N Loans

Capitalization
by
Shareholders

Capitalizatio
n

%
Shareholders/
Total
Capitalization

Total

Resolution 006 of
10
1999

492,788

160,033

652,821

24.5%

Resolution 006 of
4
2001

599,911

116,089

716,000

16.2%

Total

1,092,69
9

276,122

1,368,821

20.2%

13*

*Colpatria was the only institution to access both capitalization lines.
Source: FOGAFIN 2009.

By 2008, the government recovered COP 1.7 trillion from the payment of capital and
interest on the FOGAFIN loans granted to shareholders of private institutions. Thanks to
the financial recovery, they were able to pay in advance. Of the 13 institutions capitalized,
all except Interbanco paid their obligations to FOGAFIN in full, and before the agreed term.
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All paid in cash, with the exception of Multifinanciera, which delivered assets as a payment
to FOGAFIN. Two institutions— Interbanco and Corfinorte—were intervened and
liquidated, and two others—Credinver and Multifinanciera—were voluntarily dismantled.
All the other institutions recovered and continued in operation (FOGAFIN 2009).
Summary Evaluation
By 2001, Colombian economic indicators of solvency, profitability, portfolio quality, and
portfolio coverage showed positive trends in the banking system (Heenan et al. 2007). The
average capital adequacy ratio improved from 11.2% in December 1999 to 13.8% in
December 2000, and the average NPL ratio declined from 13.5% to 11.1%. However, it is
hard to identify how much improvement can be attributed to the capitalizations as
Colombian macroeconomic conditions improved (IMF 2001). The capitalizations of 1999
and 2001 did not represent any cost to the government, owing to the good financial
performance of the institutions that accessed them.
Given that the Colombian government underwent various reforms simultaneously, there
are few evaluations of the capitalization process. For instance, in terms of capital injections
to private banks, the IMF evaluated that “[w]hile this scheme was generally successful in
improving the capital adequacy ratios of the institutions that were supported, it does
subject FOGAFIN to losses should the banks fail but not to the gains that would accrue if the
banks’ fully recover.” The IMF also implied that capital adequacy ratios were improved as a
result of the combination of write-offs of impaired assets prior to the capital injection and
the capitalization (IMF 2001).
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Colombia Context 1998-1999
GDP
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)
GDP per capita
(SAAR, nominal GDP in LCU converted to USD)

Sovereign credit rating (five-year senior debt)

$98.4 billion in 1998
$86.2 billion in 1999
$2,566 in 1998
$2,210 in 1999
Data for 1998:
Fitch: N/A
Moody’s: Baa2
S&P: N/A
Data for1999:

Fitch: N/A
Moody’s: Baa2
S&P: BBB+
Size of banking system
Data not available for 1998
Data not available for 1999
Size of banking system as a percentage of GDP
34.2% in 1998
32.6% in 1999
Size of banking system as a percentage of financial
96.3% in1998
system
93.7% in 1999
Five-bank concentration of banking system
76.9% in 1998
83.8% in 1999
6% in 1998
Foreign involvement in banking system
22% in 1999
37% in 1998
Government ownership of banking system
18% in 1999
Yes in 1998
Existence of deposit insurance
Yes in 1999
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank Global Financial Development Database; World Bank
Deposit Insurance Dataset; Cull, Martinez Peria, and Verrier 2018.
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Key Design Decisions
1. Part of a Package: In 1999, the Colombian government initiated rescue policies
to restore confidence in the financial system and implemented a three-year
economic recovery program including capitalization lines for credit institutions,
resolution and restructuring measures for unviable banks and other financial
institutions, as well as other various rescue measures related to debtor law and
housing reform.
In 1999, due to the continuous deterioration of credit institutions, the government, through
FOGAFIN (the Financial Institutions Guarantee Fund—the state agency for bank
resolutions and deposit insurance), initiated rescue policies to restore public confidence
and solvency in the financial system. It aimed to avoid systemic risk, control moral hazard,
minimize direct government administration in the financial sector, and reduce fiscal costs
(Botero Garrido 2006). The Colombian government launched a three-year economic
recovery program supported by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank,
the Inter-American Development Bank, and the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF)
that included capitalization lines for credit institutions, resolution and restructuring
measures for unviable banks and other financial institutions, as well as other various
rescue measures related to debtor law and housing reform (FOGAFIN 2001; IMF 2001;
Morrison 2000).
In June 1999, to provide capitalization for both public and private credit institutions, the
Colombian government passed Resolution 006 of 1999. Two years later, Resolution 006 of
2001 gave the authority to further capitalize credit institutions specialized in mortgage
lending (Resolution 006 1999; Resolution 006 2001). The capitalization process for public
banks was composed of five stages: clean-up, capital strengthening, disposal of
nonperforming loans (NPLs), administrative restructuring, and sale of the institution. For
private banks, the capitalization process was composed of three stages: clean-up, capital
strengthening, and signing of a performance agreement (FOGAFIN 2000).
2. Legal Authority: Resolution 006 of 1999 provided the authority for the
capitalization of credit institutions. This was later expanded in 1999 through
Resolution 011 of 1999, and furthermore in 2001 with another capitalization
line through Resolution 006 of 2001.
On November 16, 1998, Colombia declared a “Social and Economic State of Emergency”
through Decree 2330, followed the same day with the announcement of the first set of
measures in support of the financial sector through Decree 2331 that included support
mechanisms for mortgage debtors from institutions facing liquidation (Decree 2330 1998;
Decree 2331 1998).
In June 1999, Resolution 006 of 1999 gave the authority for capitalizations of credit
institutions through FOGAFIN. Resolution 011 of 1999 allowed for institutions that
received a first FOGAFIN loan to receive a second one by June 30, 2000 (FOGAFIN 2000). In
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August 2001, Colombia passed Resolution 006 of 2001 that gave the authority for
capitalizations of credit institutions specialized in mortgage lending (Resolution 006 1999,
Resolution 006 2001).
3. Administration/Governance: FOGAFIN, with the assistance of the Banking
Superintendency, was in charge of the capitalization process of credit
institutions.
FOGAFIN was created in 1985 to deal with a previous financial crisis in the 1980s and help
with capitalization efforts of the financial system. For the Colombian crisis that started in
the late 1990s, FOGAFIN executed the government’s rescue plan, focused on the banking
system (FOGAFIN 2021).
4. Size: There was no announced limit on the total size of the recapitalizations
announced in 1999 and 2001.
There was no announced limit on the total size of the recapitalizations announced in 1999
and 2001. Overall, FOGAFIN granted loans through both capitalization lines of 1999 and
2001 for COP 1.09 trillion to 13 credit institutions. Colpatria was the only institution to
access both. Shareholders contributed COP 276 billion (20.2% of the total capitalization).
The total amount of capitalizations was COP 1.37 trillion (FOGAFIN 2009; see Figures 1–3).
A total of 10 institutions were capitalized through Resolution 006 of 1999 for a total of
COP 652,821 million, of which COP 492,788 million were FOGAFIN loans and
COP 160,033 million were contributions by shareholders (FOGAGIN 2009; see Figure 1). Of
the five private banks specialized in mortgage lending, four accessed the capitalization
through Resolution 006 of 2001. These were Colpatria, AV Villas, Colmena, and Conavi. The
other bank, Davivienda, did not request access. The total capitalization amounted to
COP 716 billion, of which COP 599.9 billion were FOGAFIN loans granted and COP 116
billion were contributions by shareholders, 16.2% of the total capitalization (FOGAFIN
2009; see Figure 2).
5. Funding Source: Funding for capitalization of credit institutions came from the
issuance of FOGAFIN bonds and the collections of the tax on financial
transactions established in 1998.
The funding for the capitalization of public banks came from the issuance of FOGAFIN
bonds and the collections of the tax on financial transactions established in 1998. Initially,
FOGAFIN issued COP 3 trillion in bonds to cover the costs of the capitalization of public
banks. However, due to higher than expected costs by more than COP 1.2 billion, a second
issuance of FOGAFIN bonds was performed (FOGAFIN 2000).
The capitalization process for private banks was financed through the issuance of FOGAFIN
bonds (backed by the Deposit Insurance Reserve) subscribed by the institutions being
capitalized. The service of the bonds was covered with the recovery of the FOGAFIN loan
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granted to shareholders, so that it did not generate a fiscal cost to the government.
FOGAFIN charged additional percentage points to the DTF5 rate, to cover the cost of
potential default, in which case, FOGAFIN enforced the guarantees provided by the
institution (Botero Garrido 2006; Resolution 006 1999; Resolution 006 2001).
6. Eligible Institutions: All credit institutions, both public and private, were eligible
in 1999, and later in 2001, only credit institutions specialized in mortgage
lending were eligible.
Both public and private credit institutions were eligible for the capitalization process under
Resolution 006 of 1999 announced in June 1999. Credit institutions had until December 31,
1999 (about six months) to apply for access (Resolution 006 1999). This line was extended
through Resolution 011 of 1999 to allow institutions that received a first FOGAFIN loan to
apply for a second one by June 30, 2000 (FOGAFIN 2000). For the 2001 capitalization line
launched to support credit institutions specialized in mortgage lending, eligible institutions
included those that had at least 50% of their portfolios in mortgage loans as of December
31, 2000. They had until July 31, 2002 to apply (Resolution 006 2001).
In regard to public banks, to preserve financial stability, strengthen their equity, recover
their viability, reduce fiscal costs of cleaning up, and minimize government participation in
the financial sector, the government decided to privatize all public banks with the
exception of Banco Agrario, which remained the only public bank, given its importance to
provide financing to small and medium-sized farmers in the country (FOGAFIN 2009).
As part of the process and a pre-requisite for capitalization, credit institutions were
required to write off their nonperforming loans in such a way that it reasonably reflected
their true economic value (Resolution 006 1999). If, after the provision and amortization of
the NPLs, the credit institution’s technical equity dropped below zero (0), its shareholders
had to capitalize the institution with their own resources to bring its technical equity to at
least zero (0).
7. Individual Participation Limits: The capitalization was set to restore a solvency
margin of 9% for public banks and 10% in the case of private banks.
For public banks, to perform the second stage of capital strengthening, FOGAFIN
capitalized institutions until reaching a solvency margin of 9%. For private credit
institutions, to perform the second stage of capital strengthening, institutions were
capitalized to restore a solvency margin of 10%. For this purpose, FOGAFIN granted loans
to shareholders of institutions to be used exclusively to capitalize their institutions.
FOGAFIN provided long-term loans for up to 90% of the amount necessary, but the longterm loans could not exceed 80% of the total capitalization. To ensure a long-term loan,
shareholders had to grant shares of the institution as collateral at a minimum value of

The DTF (fixed-term deposit rate) is calculated as the weighted average of interest rates on 90-day
certificates of deposit (CDs) offered by Colombian banks and financial institutions (Rowland 2006).
5
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133% of the loan, according to the valuation carried out by the international financial
advisors (FOGAFIN 2000; FOGAFIN 2009; Resolution 006 1999; see Figure 5).
Resolution 011 of 1999 allowed for institutions that received a first FOGAFIN loan to apply
for a second one by June 30, 2000 (FOGAFIN 2000). The resolution also stipulated that
FOGAFIN could grant loans to shareholders for up to 100% of the resources required by
the institution. An operation with Confinanciera’s shareholders was the only one carried
out under the new conditions (FOGAFIN 2009).
Under Resolution 006 of 2001, the difference was that the amount of capitalization
required was determined by the adjustments ordered by the Banking Superintendency,
while in the 1999 regulation, it was the result of a reorganization process that was
specified in the resolution (FOGAFIN 2009). Under the 2001 regulation, FOGAFIN could
invest in bonds optionally convertible into shares (BOCAS) up to 80% of the resources
required by the institution so that its solvency ratio reached 10%. In this case, the
investment was made once the shareholders had capitalized their institution, at least in an
amount equivalent to the difference between the capital necessary to achieve a 10%
solvency ratio and the value of the investment (Resolution 006 2001).
Shareholders and credit institutions that requested access could do so one or more times,
as long as they complied with the provisions of the resolution and the total amount of the
operations did not exceed 80% of the global value of the adjustments required by the
Banking Superintendency (Resolution 006 2001).
8. Capital Characteristics: FOGAFIN granted four types of assistance to capitalize
credit institutions: public bank capitalizations, bridge loans to shareholders,
loans to capitalize private banks, and loans to capitalize credit institutions
specialized in mortgage lending.
FOGAFIN granted four types of capitalization assistance: (a) public bank capitalizations, (b)
bridge loans to shareholders, (b) loans for private bank capitalizations, and (d) loans for
credit institutions specialized in mortgage lending.
(a) Public bank capitalizations
After the write-off of nonperforming assets, to perform the second stage of capital
strengthening, FOGAFIN issued bonds or invested proceeds from the financial transactions
tax to capitalize the institution until reaching a solvency margin of 9% (FOGAFIN 2000).
In the third stage, nonperforming assets were transferred to Central de Inversiones S.A.
(CISA). In September 2000, FOGAFIN acquired a CISA, a public special purpose vehicle for
the management and disposal of bad assets (FOGAFIN 2001; Heenan et al. 2007; Resolution
006 1999; also see the YPFS case study on CISA, Engbith and León Hoyos 2021).
In the fourth stage, institutions went through administrative restructuring in preparation
for their sale. The main objectives were to reduce administrative and personnel costs,
avoid the deterioration of the institutions’ assets, and reduce the upward pressure exerted
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by public institutions on the market deposit rates. The restructuring was carried out with
the assistance of specialized external consultants. In the fifth and final stage, the
institutions were sold. FOGAFIN hired investment banking firms to privatize the healthy
banks (FOGAFIN 2000).
(b) Bridge loans to shareholders:
In the first stage of clean-up, institutions had to write off their NPLs in a way that
reasonably reflected their true economic value. If, after the write-offs, the institution’s
technical equity was negative, its shareholders had to capitalize the institution with their
own resources to bring its technical equity to at least zero (0). Shareholders had to
contribute, with their own resources, at least 20% of the amount necessary to strengthen
the technical equity of the institution (FOGAFIN 2009; Resolution 006 1999).
In 1999, it was in many cases unfeasible for shareholders to capitalize immediately. To
facilitate the disbursement of resources corresponding to shareholders, FOGAFIN granted
shareholders a six-month bridge loan that allowed financing 50% of this capitalization, and
the Banking Superintendency extended the term to 12 months for the remaining 50%.
Figure 4: Characteristics of FOGAFIN Bridge Loans under Resolution 006
of 1999
Bridge Loans

FOGAFIN Bonds

Term

Up to 6 months

270 days

Interest rate

DTF* + 2%

DTF

Amortization

At maturity

At maturity

Interest payment

Semiannual

Semiannual

Guarantees

133% of the FOGAFIN
FOGAFIN
loan

*The DTF (fixed-term deposit rate) is calculated as the weighted average of
interest rates on 90-day certificates of deposit (CDs) offered by Colombian
banks and financial institutions (Rowland 2006).
Source: Resolution 006 1999.

(c) Loans for private bank capitalizations:
In the second stage of capital strengthening, it was necessary to capitalize the institution to
restore a solvency margin of 10%. For this purpose, FOGAFIN granted loans to
shareholders of institutions to be used exclusively to capitalize their institutions. FOGAFIN
provided long-term loans for up to 90% of the amount necessary, but the long-term loans
could not exceed 80% of the total capitalization. To ensure a long-term loan, shareholders
had to grant shares of the institution as collateral at a minimum value of 133% of the loan,
according to the valuation carried out by the international financial advisors (FOGAFIN
2000; FOGAFIN 2009; Resolution 006 1999; see Figure 5). FOGAFIN disbursed the loans
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directly to the participating institution receiving the capitalization, to its account at the
central bank. Once the payment was posted, the institution recorded the new level of
capitalization and immediately invested an equal amount in bonds that FOGAFIN issued for
the capitalization (Resolution 006 1999; see Figures 4–7).
Figure 5: Characteristics of FOGAFIN Loans under Resolution 006 of 1999
Loans to Shareholders

FOGAFIN Bonds

Term

3 to 7 years; expanded to 9 7 years (average)
years

Grace period for interest

1 year; expanded to 2.5 years

None

Grace period for capital

3 years; expanded to 4 years

N/A

Interest rate

DTF* + 2% (first 3 years)

DTF

DTF + 3% (last 4 years)
Amortization

Biannual

At maturity

Interest payment

Quarterly or semiannual

Quarterly

Guarantees

133% of the FOGAFIN loan

FOGAFIN

*The DTF (fixed-term deposit rate) is calculated as the weighted average of interest
rates on 90-day certificates of deposit (CDs) offered by Colombian banks and
financial institutions (Rowland 2006).
Sources: Botero Garrido 2006; Resolution 006 1999.

In any case, shareholders had to sign an adjustment plan with the Banking
Superintendency to guarantee with solid and sufficient sources of payment (letters of
credit from a first-level foreign bank or resources coming from the execution of irrevocable
commercial trust contracts that had as their objective the sale of assets, for commercial
value of at least 133% of the loan) (FOGAFIN 2000; Resolution 006 1999; see Figure 5).
Additionally, FOGAFIN established mechanisms to ensure that at least 78% of the political
rights of the total outstanding shares of the institution were immediately transferred to
FOGAFIN, in case of default. Notwithstanding, FOGAFIN’s Board of Directors could
authorize guarantees other than those indicated.
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Figure 6: General Mechanism of Capitalization Line under Resolution 006 of 1999

Source: FOGAFIN 2009, 120.

(d) Loans to credit institutions specialized in mortgage lending:
In 2001, Colombia passed Resolution 006 of 2001, which allowed for capitalizations of
credit institutions specialized in mortgage lending (Botero Garrido 2006; Resolution 006
2001). FOGAFIN granted loans to shareholders of credit institutions and/or the
subscription by FOGAFIN of bonds optionally convertible into shares issued by the
institutions (FOGAFIN 2009). Institutions could issue BOCAS, as long as such bonds
strengthened the equity of the institution, stated the irrevocable condition of being
subordinated debt, and met the following requirements:
i.

That the portfolio purchased by the shareholders corresponded exclusively to a
portfolio rated C, D, or E or to a written-off portfolio, registered as of December
31, 2000;

ii.

That the purchase value of the portfolio C, D, or E in no case was less than the net
value plus provisions of said portfolio, including interest and other items
associated with it;

iii.

That the purchase value of the written-off portfolio was in no case less than the
value recorded in memorandum accounts, including interest and other items
associated with it; and

iv.

That the respective credit institution did not enter into repurchase agreements
on the portfolio referred, directly or indirectly, during the validity of the loans
(FOGAFIN 2009; Resolution 006 2001).
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Figure 7: Characteristics of FOGAFIN Loans under Resolution 006 of 2001
Long-Term

Short-Term

BOCAS*

FOGAFIN Bonds

Term

Up to 9 years

Up to 1 year

Up to 9 years

Up to 10 years

Amount

Up to 80% of the
adjustment
determined by the
Superintendency to
reach a solvency
ratio of 10%

Up to 20% of the
adjustment
determined by
the
Superintendency
to
reach
a
solvency ratio of
10%

Grace period

Up to 2.5 years for N/A
interest and 4 years
for capital

Up to 2.5 years for
interest and 4 years
for capital

Interest rate

DTF* + 3%

DTF + 3%

DTF + 2%

DTF + 1%
Capitalization up
to the first 5
semesters

Amortization

Biannual

At expiration

Biannual

At expiration

Interest
payment

Biannual

At expiration

Biannual

At expiration

Guarantees

133% of the value 133% of the 133% of the value
of the loan in shares value of the loan of the loan in shares
pledged
in
shares pledged
pledged

*The DTF (fixed-term deposit rate) is calculated as the weighted average of interest rates on 90-day
certificates of deposit (CDs) offered by Colombian banks and financial institutions (Rowland 2006).
*BOCAS were bonds optionally convertible into shares.
Sources: Botero Garrido 2006; Resolution 006 2001.

(1) Fate of Existing Board and Management: There is no information on whether the
existing board and management at the participating banks were removed or
replaced.
Research did not reveal information regarding this Key Design Decision.
(2) Allocation of Losses for Existing Stakeholders: Prior to capitalizations, NPLs were
written off and shareholders had to capitalize their institution to bring its technical
equity to at least zero.
For private institutions, in the first stage of clean-up, institutions had to write off their NPLs
in a way that reasonably reflected their true economic value. If, after the write-offs, the
institution’s technical equity was negative, its shareholders had to capitalize the institution
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with their own resources to bring its technical equity to at least zero (0). Shareholders had
to contribute, with their own resources, at least 20% of the amount necessary to
strengthen the technical equity of the institution (FOGAFIN 2009; Resolution 006 1999).
It was agreed with the shareholders that all of the distributable dividends should be used
to pay remaining balances of the loans granted by FOGAFIN to the institution (Botero
Garrido 2006; Resolution 006 of 2001).
9. Exit Strategy: There does not seem to have been a solid exit strategy.
Research did not reveal information regarding this Key Design Decision.
10. Changes in Relevant Regulation: There do not seem to have been any relevant
changes in the regulation.
Research did not reveal information regarding this Key Design Decision.
11. Debt Restructuring Plan: As part of the capitalization process, private credit
institutions had to sign a performance agreement.
As part of the capitalization process of private credit institutions, in the third and final
stage, institutions signed a performance agreement that included the goals that they had to
meet to guarantee their solvency and the payment of the long-term loan. These goals were
defined by FOGAFIN, the financial institution, and the Banking Superintendency, with the
support of international consultants. Additionally, in each capitalized institution, an
internal control office was installed to ensure compliance with the signed agreements,
without actually comanaging the institution (FOGAFIN 2000). The control office reported
the results of its management to FOGAFIN, and its operating costs were borne by the
institution being capitalized.
Institutions capitalized had to authorize FOGAFIN and external consultants hired by
suggestion of FOGAFIN to determine and quantify the assets that should be provisioned to
determine the economic value of their shares (Resolution 006 1999).
In the fourth stage of the capitalization of public banks, institutions went through
administrative restructuring in preparation for their sale. The main objectives were to
reduce administrative and personnel costs, avoid the deterioration of the institutions’
assets, and reduce the upward pressure exerted by public institutions on the market
deposit rates. The restructuring was carried out with the assistance of specialized external
consultants (FOGAFIN 2000, 10). In the fifth and final stage, the institutions were sold.
FOGAFIN hired investment banking firms to privatize the healthy banks (FOGAFIN 2000).
12. Other Conditions: Institutions capitalized agreed to authorize FOGAFIN and
external consultants to set the economic value of the shares that maintained the
value of the guarantees.
Institutions had to authorize FOGAFIN, and external consultants hired under the
responsibility of the institution capitalized, to establish the economic value of the shares of
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the institution and any other requirement that FOGAFIN deemed necessary. Institutions
had to contract with consultants the periodic reviews of the economic value of the shares to
maintain the value of the guarantees. The costs generated by hiring external consultants or
any other concept associated with the operations was fully assumed by the institution or
shareholders. Credit institutions had to authorize the statutory auditor and the internal
auditor to provide the information required at any time by FOGAFIN. The cost arising from
these requests was to be covered by the respective institution (Resolution 006 2001).
For Resolution 006 of 2001, when the request for loans corresponded to shareholders of an
institution capitalized under Resolution 006 of 1999, FOGAFIN, with approval of its board
of directors, could authorize that some of the conditions initially granted be modified,
based on the adjustments or precautionary measures arranged or ordered by the Banking
Superintendency to the institution (Resolution 006 2001).
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